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ELECTRONIC VISUAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY: WHEN IS ELECTRONIC
OBSERVATION REASONABLE?
The threat to one's fourth amendment right of privacy' is great when
the police utilize electronic visual surveillance' as part of their investiga-
tory practices. Electronic eavesdropping3 undertaken by law enforcement
officers intrudes upon the privacy of an individual's spoken word, but
surreptitious electronic videotape surveillance seizes the visual manifesta-
tions of an individual's actions as well as aural impressions. The prospect
of private lives being publicly displayed in the courtroom as evidence of
criminal or undesirable conduct through the use of videotape surveillance
requires scrutiny under the guidance of the fourth amendment.' To ade-
quately protect the individual's fourth amendment right of privacy, use of
electronic visual surveillance must be reasonable and must be authorized
by a search warrant which complies with the specific requirements of that
amendment.5 Electronic visual surveillance presents new fourth amend-
ment 5roblems for several reasons. Because electronic visual surveillance
invades privacy to a greater extent than any currently practiced police
investigative technique,6 whether such surveillance can be a reasonable
I See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
304 (1967); text accompanying notes 46-58 infra. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].
2 "Electronic visual surveillance" includes all observation through the use of devices
capturing visual images, including videotape, closed-circuit television, infra-red cameras, and
light pipes. See generally A. WESTIN, PluvAcy AND FRE.DOM 70-73 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as WEsTIN]; Hodges, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival
of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 261, 266-69 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hodges].
3 "Electronic eavesdropping" includes all interceptions of verbal communication
through such methods as listening to telephone conversations through a wiretap, installing a
"bug" which can pick up and transmit conversations to outside listeners, and "bugging"
individuals to make them walking transmitters. See generally WESTIN, supra note 2, at 73-
78.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
See note 4 supra.
Electronic visual surveillance never can be excluded because darkness and even walls
are not necessarily a barrier to such surveillance if the proper equipment is used. See WESTIN,
supra note 2, at 70-73; Hodges, supra note 2, at 266-69. One can avoid the invasion of privacy
engendered by electronic eavesdropping simply by using another mode of communication
than verbal expression. Moreover, the intrusion effected by electronic visual surveillance is
greater than that of electronic eavesdropping. First, both aural impressions and visual images
can be seized by use of videotape surveillance devices. Hodges, supra note 2, at 294; Com-
ment, Judicial Administration-Technological Advances-Use of Videotape in the Court-
room and the Stationhouse, 20 DEPAuL L. REv. 924, 929 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Videotape in the Courtroom]. Second, an individual has no expectation that his communica-
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search and seizure under the fourth amendment must be examined.7 In
addition, the guidelines under which a search warrant authorizing elec-
tronic visual surveillance would issue are unclear. These considerations
parallel those evinced by the long debate over electronic eavesdropping
prior to the definitive pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Berger v.
New York' and Katz v. United States9 and the congressional response to
and adoption of the holdings of those decisions in Title I of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title II).,0
The Supreme Court spent forty years wrestling with the constitutional
problems presented by electronic eavesdropping before establishing a con-
clusive approach to such surveillance in Berger and Katz." In Berger, the
tion will be kept confidential once it is made to another party, United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 750-52 (1971), but one is justified in believing his physical actions will be unob-
served when they are undertaken alone in apparent privacy. Hodges, supra note 2, at 294;
cf. Avery v. Maryland, 15 Md.App. 520, 292 A.2d 728, 743 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 977
(1973) (if transmittal of conversation to the police through the cooperation of an informer does
not constitute an unreasonable seizure under United States v. White, then a video transmittal
of the accused's conduct brought about by the cooperation of a party should not be inter-
preted as constituting an unreasonable seizure in violation of the defendant's "justifiable
expectation of privacy"); State v. Johnson, 18 N.C.App. 606, 197 S.E.2d 592 (1973) (videotape
recording of man alone at a desk in a hallway admissible as evidence to prove theft of money
from billfold conspicuously placed atop desk).
I The initial draft of the fourth amendment was directed only to the essentials of a valid
warrant and did not include the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. PFma. L. Rav. 169, 181 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Spritzer]. This draft clearly showed
the framers' antipathy to searches conducted under general warrants and the enforcement of
the customs laws by overly broad writs of assistance. Id.; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765); Stengel, The Background of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Part Two, 4 U. RIcH. L.
Rav. 60 (1969). The final version of the fourth amendment, however, provides freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures and also requires a warrant issued upon probable cause.
See note 4 supra. Thus, the history of the amendment supports the conclusion that some
searches and seizures can be inherently unreasonable and invalid even with a warrant which
otherwise accords with the warrant requirements of the amendment. N. LAssoN, THImToRY
AND DvmWLoPr NTr OF TH FounRH AmENDMwsrr To THE UrrE STATES CONSTrruTiON 103 (1937);
Spritzer, supra at 182.
8 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
9 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
tO 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976); see text accompanying notes 32-42 infra.
"The Supreme Court first considered electronic eavesdropping in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), a wiretapping case. See note 3 supra. Construing the fourth
amendment literally, the Court held that a conversation seized through a wiretap was not a
"material thing" and thus not entitled to constitutional protection. 277 U.S. at 464-68. The
Court also held that because there was no physical trespass on Olmstead's premises in
executing the wiretap, a search warrant was not required. Id. In Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Supreme Court first considered "bugging," see note 3 supra, holding
that the warrantless seizure of conversations by means of a detectaphone without a physical
trespass did not violate the fourth amendment. 316 U.S. at 135. A decade later, the Court
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Supreme Court held that oral statements are protected by the fourth
amendment12 and that a warrant authorizing electronic eavesdropping
must meet cetain minimum requirements. 3 The Court required the appli-
cation for an electronic eavesdropping warrant to show probable cause that
held that an informer wired for sound transmitting an incriminating conversation to police
stationed outside was not a search or seizure within the fourth amendment because the
communications were not protected by the amendment and there was no physical trespass.
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Intangible voice communication first was held subject to the protections of the fourth
amendment in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). The Silverman Court held
that the unauthorized physical penetration of the defendant's premises with a spike mike
inserted into a party wall connected with defendant's premises was an unreasonable search
and seizure because of the physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 509-
12; see text accompanying note 26 infra. Although the Supreme Court emphasized that a
physical trespass distinguished Silverman from Olmstead, Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. at 509-12, the Court simply ignored Olmstead's limitation of fourth amendment protec-
tion to "material things." Id. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), the Court
validated the warrantless tape recording by an IRS agent of incriminating statements made
by a taxpayer who sought to bribe him. Without specifically reaffirming On Lee, the Court
emphasized that "[t]he Government did not use an electronic device to listen in on conversa-
tions it could not otherwise have heard." Id. at 439. Lopez had known he was talking with a
federal officer, and the only result of excluding the tape would have been to permit Lopez
"to rely on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility
without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment." Id.;
see Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (judicially authorized surreptitious tape
recording of an incriminating conversation by an informant participating in the conversation
held valid).
Finally, in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Supreme Court paved the way
for complete fourth amendment protection of intangible property as the Court stated that
the fourth amendment protects privacy, not property. Id. at 304. The Court allowed the
seizure of clothing belonging to the defendant as property constituting evidence of the com-
mission of a crime. Id. at 302-03. The seizure of "mere evidence," which is evidence not
constituting fruits or instrumentalities of the crime, or contraband, had been prohibited prior
to Hayden. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (search warrants "may not
be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the
purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal
proceeding ....."). The Gouled "mere evidence" rule was abandoned in Hayden. 387 U.S. at
310. In Hayden, the Supreme Court did not consider whether evidence which is "testimonial"
or "communicative" in nature can be the object of a reasonable search and seizure, holding
only that the siezure of the tangible property involved in that case was permissible. Id. at
302-03. The Court was concerned that the seizure of "testimonial" or "communicative"
evidence might violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. In later
decisions, however, the Supreme Court has held such "property" to be protected by the fourth
amendment right of privacy and not the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); cf.
United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 896 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jessup v. United
States, 396 U.S. 852 (1969) (protection of the "mere evidence" rule should be replaced with
an approach geared to the objective of the fourth amendment to secure privacy rather than
a fifth amendment approach based on the testimonial character of what is seized).
" 388 U.S. at 51.
I' Id. The Berger Court struck down New York's former electronic eavesdropping statute
for failure to comply with fourth amendment requirements. Id. at 43-44; see N. Y. CoDE CrM.
PRoc. §813-a (1958) (repealed L. 1968, c. 546, §1, eff. June 5, 1968; current version N. Y. CuRd.
PRoc. LAw, Article 700 (McKinney 1971)).
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an offense has been or is being committed.1' The application also was
required to state with particularity the offense being investigated, 5 the
place to be searched, 6 and the conversations to be seized. 7 In addition, the
Court held that a neutral and detached person must approve the applica-
tion and issue an order authorizing the surveillance." The order must state
with particularity the conversations to be seized," must be executed with
dispatch,"0 and must require that the surveillance not continue beyond the
seizure of the conversations sought.2' Finally, the Berger Court stated that
exigent circumstances must justify the failure to notify the subject of the
surveillance" and that a report of the eavesdropping results must be made
to the issuing authority.? Thus, the Supreme Court in Berger not only
expressly extended the protection of the fourth amendment to oral in-
tangibles, but also enunciated specific guidelines to ensure the protection
of those intangibles unless due cause exists to seize them.
In Katz v. United States,2' the Supreme Court extended the Berger
guidelines to protect one's justifiable reliance on privacy against warrant-
less searches and seizures regardless of whether a physical trespass oc-
curs.? The Court thus abandoned the concept of constitutionally protected
areas82 and unwarranted physical trespasses of those areas as violative of
388 U.S. at 55; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(b), (3)(a),(b) (1976).
388 U.S. at 58-59; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(b)(i) (1976).
" 388 U.S. at 55, 58; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(b)(ii) (1976).
388 U.S. at 58; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(b)(iii), (4)(c) (1976).
" 388 U.S. at 54; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (issuing authority
must be a judicial officer); 18 U.S.C. §2516 (1976) (issuing authority must be a judge).
I 388 U.S. at 58; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(b)(iii), (4)(c) (1976).
388 U.S. at 59; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(5) (1976). The Berger Court indicated that the
surveillance is not to be prolonged or extended over a greater period of time than is absolutely
necessary under the circumstances. See 388 U.S. at 57.
" 388 U.S. at 59-60; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(d), (4)(e), (5) (1976).
12 388 U.S. at 60; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(c), (3)(c), (8)(d) (1976). The necessity of show-
ing exigency for the surreptitious entry to place the "bug" is crucial if no notice is to be given
in order to maintain secrecy. 388 U.S. at 60. "Exigent circumstances" are defined by N. Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAw §700.05(7) (McKinney 1971) as "conditions requiring the preservation of
secrecy, and whereby there is a reasonable likelihood that a continuing investigation would
be thwarted by alerting any of the persons subject to surveillance to the fact that such
surveillance had occurred."
" 388 U.S. at 60; see 18 U.S.C. §2518(8)(a) (1976).
2' 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Id. at 353. Abandonment of the physical trespass rule in Katz was a dramatic shift
from prior Supreme Court decisions where warrantless electronic eavesdropping was not
invalidated because no physical trespass occurred. See note 11 supra.
26 The Katz Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 389
U.S. at 351. Prior to Katz, certain areas were treated by courts as private and thus entitled
to fourth amendment protection while other areas were accorded no protection because they
were considered public. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study
of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N. Y. U. L. Rzv. 968, 976 (1968). The concept of
constitutionally protected areas was dependent on the idea of a physical trespass into en-
closed or clearly defined places. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that a constitutionally
protected area is an area holding an attribute of privacy which comes within the scope of
protection offered by the fourth amendment. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
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the fourth amendment in favor or protecting one's "expectation of privacy"
wherever justified.2 Katz held that the bugging of a public telephone booth
by law enforcement agents without a warrant violated the fourth amend-
ment despite the lack of a physical trespass.2s The Katz Court clearly
stated, however, that despite one's expectation of privacy, a limited intru-
sion through electronic eavesdropping could constitute a reasonable search
and seizure.
2 1
In response to Katz and Berger, Congress enacted Title TIP to control
the use of electronic eavesdropping by federal law enforcement agents.
Many states also have enacted state electronic eavesdropping statutes pat-
terned after Title I"2' The use of electronic visual surveillance, however,
is not included within the scope of Title I or the state statutes. 2 Thus,
the federal statute provides only an analogous set of guidelines in consider-
ing the constitutional prerequisites for the issuance of warrants authorizing
the seizure of visual images. Title II[ requires prior judicial approval of all
electronic eavesdropping by federal law enforcement agents, subject to
In Lanza, the Court cited various cases in which such divergent areas as a business office,
store, hotel room, apartment, automobile, and taxicab were held by the Court to be constitu-
tionally protected areas. Id.
v 389 U.S. at 351-53. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz coined the phrase
"expectation of privacy," id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring), and courts have preferred this
phrase to the majority's "privacy upon which [one] justifiably relied." Id. at 353; see, e.g.,
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
389 U.S. at 353, 358-59.
Id. at 354, 356-59. The Katz Court intimated that had the law enforcement agents
established probable cause for the surveillance before a neutral magistrate, and been con-
trolled in the execution of their surveillance by a warrant particularly limiting their discre-
tion, electronic eavesdropping would have been proper. Id. at 356. Additionally, the officers
would have been required to promptly notify the authorizing magistrate of the surveillance
results. Id.
" 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 (1976); see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
reprinted in [1968] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2163.
" New York's electronic eavesdropping statute, for example, follows the language of Title
1H with little variation. See N. Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW, Article 700 (McKinney 1971). For a listing
of other states that have and have not enacted electronic eavesdropping statutes, see 56 B.
U. L. Rxv. 600, 601 nn.14 & 15 (1976).
3 Section 2511 of Title 11, 18 U.S.C. §2511 (1976), limits the scope of the statute to the
interception of wire and oral communications as defined in 18 U.S.C. §2510 (1976). Section
2510(4) defines "interception" as the aural acquisition of any wire or oral communication.
Electronic visual surveillance was clearly not contemplated by the draftsmen of Title I. The
scope of New York's eavesdropping statute also extends only to the aural seizure of communi-
cations and not to the seizure of visual images. See N. Y. CRmI. PRoc. LAw §§700.05(1), (2),
& (3); 700.10 (telephonic or telegraphic communications, conversations, discussions may be
seized under eavesdropping warrants); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTaONIC SURVEILLANCE 104 (Approved Draft 1971) (stan-
dards expressly limited to aural surveillance; visual surveillance not considered at that time).
The second edition of the ABA draft currently being written also expresses no view on visual
surveillance. Letter from Randolph Baker, Director of Project to Update Criminal Justice
Standards, Standing Committee on ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, May 4, 1978 (on
file WASH. & LEE L. REv.).
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several exceptions.3 3 Section 251831 requires the officer seeking the warrant
to establish probable cause for the search15 and requires the approval of the
surveillance by a judge.36 The order authorizing the surveillance must state
with particularity the communication to be seized and must require the
minimization of the interception of conversations unrelated to the alleged
criminal activity.3 Finally, both the application for the warrant and the
authorizing order must be premised on a finding that normal investigative
techniques have been or will be unavailing or too dangerous.3 9 Thus, elec-
tronic eavesdropping is a permissible law enforcement technique, but is
subject to legislative limitation and judicial control through Title ]I1 and
the various state equivalents.
Fourth amendment protection has evolved from protection of "material
things" and a prohibition against physical trespass 0 to protection of the
individual's justifiable "expectation of privacy." This evolution reached its
apex in Katz and was given effect by Title III, but was subsequently
constricted by United States v. White.4" The White Court upheld the war-
rantless monitoring by police of private conversations between a consent-
ing informant and the defendant.42 The Supreme Court stated that there
See 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(c) (1976) (interception without prior judicial authorization of
communication is lawful where person acting under color of law is a party to the communica-
tion or one of the parties to the communication gave prior consent to such interception); id.
at §2511(2)(d) (person not acting under color of law may intercept communications to which
he is a party or to which one of the parties has given prior consent to such interception,
without prior judicial approval); id. at §2511(3) (President may intercept communications
for national security purposes without judicial authorization). For other circumstances in
which warrantless electronic eavesdropping is permissible, see id. at §2511(2)(a), (b).
18 U.S.C. §2518 (1976).
Id. at §2518(1)(b), (3)(a), (b), (d). Before issuing an electronic eavesdropping order,
the judge must determine, based on the facts submitted by the applicant, that there is
probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or will commit a
crime. Id. at §2518(3)(a). Probable cause to believe that communications concerning that
crime will be intercepted by the surveillance and that the place where the interceptions are
to be made is used in connection with the crime must also be shown. Id. at §2518(3)(b), (d).
n Id. at §2518(1).
31 Id. at §2518(4)(c).
3S Id. at §2518(5).
1, Id. at §2518(1)(c), (3)(c).
," See note 11 supra.
41 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
,1 Id. at 753-54. The White Court held that the defendant had no justifiable expectation
of privacy because "one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his com-
panions may be reporting to the police." Id. at 752. In addition, the White Court noted that
Katz was to be given only prospective effect, see Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969),
and the eavesdropping in White occurred before the Katz decision. 401 U.S. at 754; id. at
755 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court of Appeals in White had read Katz as overruling
On Lee, see note 11 supra, and thus prohibiting the warrantless transmission of a conversation
to police stationed outside. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1969). The
Supreme Court disagreed, refusing to overrule On Lee, 401 U.S. at 750, by a plurality vote.
Id. at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring). Yet, three justices indicated that they interpreted
Katz as overruling On Lee. Id.; id. at 758-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 769, 773-93
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Given the retirements of the late Justice Harlan and Justice Douglas,
On Lee is probably still good law.
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was no constitutional difference between an agent immediately transcrib-
ing the conversation, simultaneously tape recording the conversation, or
broadcasting the conversation to third parties because all are outside the
pale of the fourth amendment. 3 Reasoning that such actions are not sub-
ject to fourth amendment protections because one contemplating illegal
activities assumes the risk that his accomplices may be reporting to the
police and thus has no justifiable expectation of privacy," the Court's
concern over individual privacy and personal liberty as championed in
Katz was eviscerated somewhat by its holding in White."5
To the extent that electronic videotape surveillance invades privacy
and involves a seizure of visual as well as aural images, its use is not
directly subject to the controls of electronic eavesdropping legislation."
The underlying rationale of the Katz decision indicates, however, that the
fourth amendment is applicable to visual images where the individual has
justifiably relied on his privacy.7 The seizure of one's physical actions
conducted in private is an extreme intrusion upon one's right of privacy,
expecially since careful preparatory steps to ensure privacy cannot close
out the unwanted electronic eye from observing and recording the most
intimate activities for others to examine in detail.48 Since the Supreme
Court has formulated the test of a reasonable search under the fourth
amendment as a balance between the need to search and the invasion such
search would entail,49 an evaluation of the necessity of electronic visual
surveillance is paramount in determining the reasonableness of such sur-
veillance under the fourth amendment.
The debate over whether electronic eavesdropping is a necessary tool
of law enforcement has long plagued its use,"9 but both the Supreme Court
a 401 U.S. at 751; see note 42 supra.
"401 U.S. at 751.
41 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at
768 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 406-07 (the voluntary assumption
of risk of confidants who are also police informants is "wildly beside the point" that the fourth
amendment protects privacy).
1' See text accompanying note 32 supra. The electronic eavesdropping portion of a video-
tape order may be authorized by existing eavesdropping statutes, however, even though the
video portion is not so authorized. See FINAL RESEARCH REPor OF THE VIEOTAPE STUDY
COMMrrrEE, CRmusNAL LAw SECTION, VIRGINIA STATE BAR 70-71 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
VIDEOTAPE STUDY CommrrrEE]; text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
0 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
304 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 1,'2, & 6 supra.
' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
The primary justification asserted in support of electronic eavesdropping is that it is
necessary in combating organized crime and sophisticated criminals. E.g., S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [1968] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2157;
ABA PRoJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELEC-
TRONIc SURVEANCE 96-97 (Approved Draft 1971); Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 835, 854 (1960). Those opposed to the use of
electronic surveillance point to its invasion of privacy, its chilling effect on free speech and
association, and the minimal return on the tremendous amount of surveillance undertaken.
E.g., H. ScHwARz, TAPS, BUos, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 15-25, 33-34 (1977); H. ScHwARz, A
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and Congress have accepted electronic eavesdropping as constitutional
and have permitted its limited use.5' Videotape surveillance, however, in-
corporates the added intrusion of the seizure of visual images in addition
to the seizure of aural impressions, thus creating an extreme invasion
where one has a justifiable expectation of privacy. If electronic visual sur-
veillance cannot be justified as necessary because other less intrusive
methods will suffice, then such surveillance cannot be reasonable under
the Supreme Court's balancing test.52 If less intrusive means will not suf-
fice, the fourth amendment protection of individual privacy must be mea-
sured against the government's duty to protect and preserve the public
well-being.53 Each application for an electronic visual surveillance warrant
thus requires an examination on its merits to determine necessity and
reasonableness. 4 Whether electronic visual surveillance is necessary in law
enforcement or is simply a means for lazy policework has not been docu-
mented, but several courts have admitted the fruits of such surveillance
into evidence in criminal trials. Conventional law enforcement techniques
and electronic eavesdropping, however, may be adequate in handling most
investigations of criminal activity." Electronic visual surveillance gener-
REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 29-33, 45-46 (1971); Spritzer,
supra note 7, at 200-01; see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 446 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1, See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 (1976).
52 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
0' See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); United States v.
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 979
(4th Cir. 1973).
- Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping warrant cannot
issue without a particular showing of the relevant circumstances in each case); 18 U.S.C.
§2518 (1976) (judge must make particular findings on every application for electronic eaves-
dropping warrant).
-1 See United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972) (pictures and video-
tape of marijuana growing in defendant's fenced-in back yard taken without a warrant does
not violate the fourth amendment because plants in plain view); Avery v. Maryland, 15
Md.App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1973) (observation of defendant
sexually molesting woman in her premises through use of closed-circuit television secreted in
her apartment with her co-operation and consent not within the protection of fourth amend-
ment under United States v. White, see text accompanying notes 44-45 supra); Sponick v.
City of Detroit Police Dep't, 49 Mich.App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973) (police officers video-
taped in bar talking with known criminals did not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
because officers observed in a public place); People v. Teicher, 90 Misc.2d 638, 395 N.Y.S.2d
587 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (judicially authorized videotape of dentist molesting a female patient in
his offices does not violate the fourth amendment because warrant obtained). But cf. United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (telescopic observation into room of
defendant's premises without a warrant violates defendant's fourth amendment right of pri-
vacy); People v. Abruzzi, 52 App.Div.2d 499, 385 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1976) (warrantless visual
observation of defendant's office by police officer required to trespass on defendant's land,
climb a seven-foot ladder, and peer through heavily curtained window invalid because viola-
tive of one's reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion); People v. Diaz,
85 Misc.2d 41, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1975) (warrantless visual observation of
department store fitting room unreasonable search under fourth amendment).
" Hodges, supra note 2, at 290-96. In United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973),
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ally provides corroborating evidence of crime and does not enable the
prosecution of suspected criminals without more evidence. 7 Courts have
noted, however, that in some cases electronic visual surveillance may pro-
vide the only evidence of criminal activity sufficient to prosecute.58
In People v. Teicher, 11 a New York trial court recently determined the
requirements to be met for issuance of an electronic visual surveillance
warrant and the scope of such a warrant. The court held that the aural
seizure of communications through the use of a videotape device was au-
thorized under the state electronic eavesdropping statute,"0 while seizure
of the visual images was authorized under the general New York search
warrant statute.6 In the alternative, the court held that the warrant was
authorized under the inherent power of the trial court to aid criminal
investigations and issue necessary judicial process toward that end."
Under both theories, the Teicher court held the issuance of the warrant to
strict requirements of probable cause for the search and seizure, particular-
ity in the description of the premises to be searched and the "property" to
the court quoted from the affidavit of an FBI agent investigating a gambling conspiracy
seeking an electronic eavesdropping warrant:
Physical surveillances on gambling operations... have failed to furnish substantial
information of a federal gambling violation because there is little or no personal
contact between these persons. If surveillance is conducted on a regular basis, it
would jeopardize the investigation. Furthermore, the utilization of undercover
agents would not likely prove a federal violation due to the small number of people
who have access to the overall plan or scheme.
Id. at 983. If there is little or no personal contact between the conspirators, electronic visual
surveillance would provide little if any evidence of the conspiracy. Videotaping the exchange
of money between alleged conspirators, for example, provides little more than corroborative
evidence of a gambling conspiracy. The videotaped exchange of a package in return for money
does not constitute sufficient evidence of a drug sale. Intercepting communications between
conspirators, and not recording physical actions, is the most likely means of obtaining incrim-
inating evidence of an illegal activity. Hodges, supra note 2, at 293. Nevertheless, the silent,
physical crime against another poses the most likely situation in which electronic visual
surveillance would be necessary in order to obtain evidence sufficient to prosecute. See Avery
v. Maryland, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972); People v. Teicher, 90 Misc.2d 638, 395
N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
See note 56 supra.
See Avery v. Maryland, 15 Md.App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972); People v. Teicher, 90
Misc.2d 638, 395 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
90 Misc.2d 638, 395 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
395 N.Y.S.2d at 591-93; see text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
SI 395 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93; see text accompanying notes 75-92 infra. N. Y. CRIM. Pnoc.
LAw §60.10 (McKinney 1971) provides:
Personal property is subject to seizure pursuant to a search warrant if there is
reasonable cause to believe that it:
1. Is stolen; or
2. Is unlawfully possessed; or
3. Has been used, or is possessed for the purpose of being used, to commit or
conceal the commission of an offense; or
4. Constitutes evidence or tends to demonstrate that an offense was commit-
ted or that a particular person participated in the commission of an offense.
12 395 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93; see text accompanying notes 93-101 infra.
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be seized, a showing of necessity for the electronic visual surveillance, and
minimization of the intrusion."
Teicher, a Manhattan dentist, was accused of molesting three female
patients while they were under examination in the dental chair." Because
Teicher was a professional, the district attorney and police sought corro-
boration of the patients' complaints through the use of electronic visual
surveillance before making an arrest. 5 Videotape surveillance was consid-
ered necessary by the prosecution because Teicher allegedly gave the pa-
tients drug injections, rendering them "physically helpless" and thus sub-
jecting their accounts of what happened to attack as being unreliable."
The police thus obtained a warrant authorizing videotape surveillance of
the examination room when females cooperating with the police were in
the dental chair. The videotape camera was secreted in the examination
room"7 and Teicher was subsequently videotaped molesting an undercover
policewoman. 8 Teicher sought to suppress the videotape on the grounds
that there was no statutory authority for the issuance of an electronic
visual surveillance warrant in New York69 and, alternatively, that the war-
rant issued was faulty in several procedural respects." The trial court
nevertheless denied Teicher's motion to suppress the videotape, holding
that it would be admissible as evidence at trial.7
The Teicher court analyzed the admissibility of the videotape by con-
sidering its individual components, the aural impressions and the visual
images. The court correctly decided that the aural seizure fell within the
authorization of the New York eavesdropping statute. 2 That statute allows
the seizure under a warrant of "intercepted communications," including
conversation intentionally recorded through the use of recording equip-
ment by persons not present. 3 The aural seizure effected through videotap-
ing by recording sound impulses thus falls within the purview of the New
York eavesdropping statute.7 '
13 395 N.Y.S.2d at 593-96.
" Id. at 589.
11 Id. at 594 n.6.
6B Id. at 589, 594, 596.
'7 Id. at 589, 595.
U Id. at 589, 596.
" Id. at 590-93.
7o Id. at 590, 593-96. The defendant objected to the warrant as having the following
procedural defects: the affidavits supporting the application for the electronic eavesdropping
warrant were based on unsupported hearsay and thus did not establish probable cause for
the search and seizure, see text accompanying notes 102-11 infra; there was inadequate
particularization of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, see text accompany-
ing notes 112-20 infra; the warrant did not provide for sufficient minimization of the intrusive
interceptions, see text accompanying notes 121-29 infra; and there was an inadequate showing
of necessity for the search. 395 N.Y.S.2d at 593-96; see text accompanying notes 130-33 infra.
11 395 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
72 Id. at 591-93; see N. Y. Cram. PRoc. LAw § §700.05, 700.10, 700.15 (McKinney 1971);
VDEOTAPE STUDY CoMMmrEE, supra note 46, at 70-71.
" See N. Y. Cnim. Paoc. LAW §§700.05(2), (3)(b), 700.10(1) (McKinney 1971).
" Videotaping consists of the simultaneous use of a camera and microphone to convert
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The court further stated that the visual images captured by the video-
tape were "property" constituting evidence or demonstrating that a crime
had been committed and were within the scope of the general New York
search warrant statute."5 This contention that visual images are "property"
and can be seized under a search warrant as evidence demonstrating the
commission of an offense is a possible interpretation of the general New
York search warrant statute. The statutory provision"6 is broadly drafted
and arguably can encompass the seizure of intangible property. The stat-
ute, however, states that "personal property" subject to seizure includes
property that is stolen, unlawfully possessed, or used to commit or conceal
the commission of an offense." All such property is necessarily tangible.
Thus, the further provision authorizing the seizure of personal property
constituting evidence of a crime or tending to demonstrate the commission
of an offense, 8 without specifically extending the statute's scope to intan-
gibles, arguably also is limited to tangible property." The fact that aural
intangibles can only be seized under the strict guidelines of New York's
electronic eavesdropping statute" also militates against the view that in-
tangibles can be seized under the general search warrant statute. To argue
that visual images are "personal property" subject to seizure under a stat-
ute that appears to allow only the seizure of tangible property is a tortuous
construction of the statute.8'
light energy into electronic signals and sound waves into electronic impulses, both of which
are recorded on tape for future viewing and listening. Videotape in the Courtroom, supra note
6, at 929.
7' 395 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93; see note 61 supra.
7, See note 61 supra. "Personal property" is broadly and generally defined as "everything
that is the subject of ownership, not coming under denomination of real estate. A right or
interest in things personal, or right or interest less than a freehold in realty, or right or interest
which one has in things movable." BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1382 (4th rev. ed. 1968). To
construe intangible visual images as "personal property" within the general definition is not
a reasonable interpretation of the English language.
n N. Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw §690.10(1), (2), (3) (McKinney 1971).
n Id. at 690.10(4).
71 See note 81 infra.
See N. Y. CrmM. PRoc. LAw, Article 700 (McKinney 1971).
" A comparison of similar statutes in other states supports the view that general search
warrant statutes are limited to the authorization of the seizure of tangible property. Virginia
allows the seizure of "any object or thing, including without limitation, documents, books,
papers, records or body fluids, constituting evidence of the commission of crime." VA. CoDE
§19.2-53(4) (1975). The enumeration of tangible items within the provision in question sup-
ports the limitation of the statute to tangible property or things. Several state statutes
expressly provide that the property subject to seizure as evidence of a crime is tangible
property. See GA. Cons ANN. §27-303(e) (1978); IND. STAT. ANN. §35-1-6-1(a), (b) (Bums
1975); NEV. Rav. STAT. §§179.015, 179.035 (1975). Hawaii's statute provides that a search
warrant will be issued "to discover articles necessary to be produced as evidence or otherwise
at the trial of any one accused of a criminal offense." HAwA Rav. STAT. §803-32(5) (1976)
(emphasis added). Several statutes have comments following them which indicate that the
provisions allowing the seizure of property constituting evidence of a crime were enacted to
take advantage of the overruling of the "mere evidence" rule in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967), which held that the seizure of tangible evidence of a crime is admissible at trial.
See N. Y. CRim. PRoc. LAw §690.10, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN.
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Other courts, however, have given similarly broad constructions to the
property concept in general search warrant statutes. The Sixth Circuit in
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. United Statesu concluded that under Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)(1),1 which authorizes the seizure of
property constituting evidence of the commission of a crime, federal courts
should allow the seizure of intangible property because of the expanding
use of electronic surveillance."' In Michigan Bell, the intangibles seized
under a warrant were telephone impulses recorded by telephone company
equipment. The court stated that the definition of property subject to
seizure enunciated in Rule 41(b) is not all inclusive and that the scope of
the property included should expand to include intangibles as their seizure
becomes possible through advanced technology., In an earlier New York
case on which the Teicher court relied, People v. Abruzzi,"8 testimony
concening visual observations by a police officer were suppressed as evi-
dence flowing from an unlawful search of the defendant's office because no
search warrant was obtained.7 In order to make the observations, the
§968.13, Comment of the Judicial Council Criminal Rules Committee (1971); note 11 supra.
The general search warrant statutes which are ambiguous in their scope, see, e.g., N. Y. Cimw.
PROc. LAw §690.10 (McKinney 1971), were not intended to extend to the seizure of intangible
property because of the wording of prior enumerations in the statutes which effectively limit
property properly seizeable to tangible property. See VIDEOTAPE STUDY CoMmrrrE, supra note
46, at 70-71.
565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).
3FED. R. CriM. P. 41(b) states:
(b) Property Which May Be Seized With a Warrant. A warrant may be issued
under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes evidence of
the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or
things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use
or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense.
565 F.2d at 389.
Id. Rule 41(b), however, appears to have been intended to cover only tangible property.
The legislative history of the Rule states that subdivision (b) was amended to accord with
Warden v. Hayden and the overruling of the "mere evidence" rule. See 18 U.S.C.A. FED. R.
CIm. P. 41, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1972 Amendment, p. 484 (1976); note
11 supra. The language of Hayden itself supports a limitation of property seized as evidence
to tangible property. The Hayden Court speaks of "items of evidential value," which connotes
tangible property, not property seizeable because they are "testimonial" or "communica-
tive." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1967). The holding of Hayden was that
tangible property may be seized as evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 300-10; see note 11
supra. Moreover, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has proposed an
amendment to Rule 41(b) changing the heading from "Property Which May Be Seized With
a Warrant" to "Objects Which May Be Seized With a Warrant," thus supporting the view
that the scope of the Rule is to be limited to tangible property. The Committee offered as
the reason for the change the inclusion of persons who can be seized with a warrant. Never-
theless, "object" does not connote intangible property. See COMMrrrE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELim ARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DisTRcr CoUms (1978), reprinted in 77 F.R.D. 507, 581; note 83 supra.
" 52 App.Div.2d 499, 385 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1976); see People v. Teicher, 395 N.Y.S.2d 587,
592 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
"52 App.Div.2d at 500, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
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officer trespassed on the defendant's property and climbed a seven-foot
ladder to peer through the open portion of a heavily curtained window. s
The court in Teicher stated that the Abruzzi court's holding that a search
warrant was required to authorize the officer's visual observations involved
an implicit recognition by that court that a search warrant could have
issued for such observations under the general search warrant statute."9
The Abruzzi court, however, clearly took no position on whether intan-
gible visual images could be seized and recorded under the authority of
the general search warrant statute." Moreover, the difference between
eyewitness testimony and a video reproduction is significant because the
unaided use of an officer's physical senses does not constitute as great an
invasion of privacy as does the use of a hidden camera which extends those
senses.' Thus, while the question of whether intangible property can be
seized under a general search warrant statute is not yet settled, the legality
and constitutionality of extending the statute beyond its apparent scope
or grafting the electronic eavesdropping and general search warrant stat-
utes together to create a hybrid authorizing electronic visual surveillance
appears doubtful.2
u Id. at 501, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
0 People v. Teicher, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 592. But see text accompanying notes 75-81 supra.
" The Abruzzi court did not decide whether a search warrant would have issued, thus
authorizing the visual observation by the officer. The court noted that search warrants are
required wherever one has a justifiable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion,
subject to several carefully defined exceptions, such as plain view, hot pursuit, and other
definitive exigent circumstances. 52 App.Div.2d at 501, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 96. Since the search
in Abruzzi did not fall within any of the exceptions, id., 385 N.Y.S.2d at 96, a search warrant
of some type was required to validate the search. The fact that a warrant was not obtained
and not whether one could have been obtained was the issue the court considered. Id., 385
N.Y.S.2d at 96. There are two problems with concluding, as did the Teicher court, that a
search warrant in Abruzzi could have been issued to authorize the officer's visual observa-
tions. The New York general search warrant statute does not appear to allow the seizure of
visual images where one has a justifiable expectation of privacy. See text accompanying notes
75-81 supra. Moreover, there is a recognized distinction between the intrusion visited by an
officer's unaided eye and that of an all-seeing electronic eye. See text accompanying note 91
infra. At most, Abruzzi is authority for the proposition that a search warrant would issue to
allow a police officer to pierce one's justifiable expectation of privacy and "search" actions
with his own eyes. However, the decision is not authority for the issuance of videotape
warrants.
," See United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921
(1973); United. States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (D. Hawaii 1976). The Kim court
differentiated between situations where the police used artificial amplification devices and
where they did not. Where there is no trespass but a justifiable expectation of privacy, an
aided visual search is unreasonable without a warrant, but an unaided search is valid. Id.
Under this analysis, the physical trespass inAbruzzi was unreasonable, but the visual obser-
vation was not necessarily invalid because the officer's eyesight was not extended. Thus,
under N. Y. CmRd. PRoc. LAw §690.05(2) (McKinney 1971), a search warrant could have
issued to allow the physical trespass, but the oficer's action in peering through curtained
windows would have been subjected to a fourth amendment reasonableness test to determine
whether the seizure of the visual observations was proper or validated by an exception to the
requirement of a warrant to protect privacy.
11 See VMzOTAPE STUDY Cowmrrrm, supra note 46, at 70-71. The Committee concluded
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The alternative ground relied upon by the Teicher court as authority
for the issuance of an electronic visual surveillance warrant was that the
issuing court had inherent power to employ necessary judicial process to
assist in criminal investigations." In support of this proposition, the court
cited the practice of New York trial courts in colonial and immediate post-
revolutionary days to issue search warrants based solely on their inherent
power to do so." Regardless of the early practice of courts in New York, a
search warrant in New York and other states today can be issued only
pursuant to statutory authorization." Thus, as the law currently stands in
New York, courts cannot legally issue warrants for electronic seizure of
visual images because there is no statutory provision authorizing the issu-
ance of such warrants.98 Moreover, the fact that the legislature has deemed
it necessary to codify the search warrant process in the electronic eaves-
dropping field arguably supports the contention that the seizure of intangi-
ble property through an invasion of privacy requires express legislative
authorization. 7
To ensure that the issuing judge complies with the requirements of the
fourth amendment and to clarify any confusion surrounding the use of
that if a videotape warrant is to be issued in Virginia, either the general search warrant
statute or the eavesdropping statute would have to be amended to allow the seizure of visual
images, or an electronic visual surveillance statute would have to be enacted. Id. at 71.
13 395 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93.
" Id. Citation of colonial and early American examples of inherent power to issue search
warrants offers little aid in determining whether the present New York trial courts have the
power as no statutes authorizing courts to issue search warrants existed at that time. See A.
CoRNELIus, THE LAw OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§151, 155 (2d ed. 1930) [hereinafter cited as
Cornelius].
" See White v. Wagar, 185 Ill. 195, 57 N.E. 26,'28 (1900); State v. Creel, 152 La. 888, 94
So. 433, 434-35 (1922); State v. Tunnell, 302 Mo. 433, 259 S.W. 128, 129 (1924); People ex
rel. Robert Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 795-96 (1913); People v.
Richter, 265 App.Div. 767, 40 N.Y.S.2d 751, 755-56, aff'd, 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943);
State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 351 (1920). See generally CoRNELMs, supra note
94, at §155; H. ROTHBLATr, CRMNAL LAW OF NEW YORK - THE CuMmA PRocEDun LAw §569,
at 464 (1971); J. VARON, SEARCHES, SmaUREs AND huNrEs 278, 437 (2d ed. 1974). The
Teicher court cited In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 258, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (1899), as authority
for its inherent power to issue necessary judicial process in aid of police investigations. 395
N.Y.S.2d at 593. In Steinway, the New York Court of Appeals had stated that "we have the
powers of the court of kings bench and the court of chancery as they existed when the first
[state] constitution was adopted [in 1777], blended and construed in the supreme court of
the state, except as modified by constitution or statute." 159 N.Y. at 258, 53 N.E. at 1105.
In a later Court of Appeals case, however, the court stated that the basis for a search warrant
had progressed from the discretion vested in a justice of the peace under the English practice
to a statutory system which foreclosed the prior unbounded discretion of the English justices
of the peace. People ex rel. Robert Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 796
(1913). The Simpson Court concluded that under the statutory scheme, a search warrant
could not be issued for any purpose except as stated by statute. 101 N.E. at 795. Whatever
vitality Steinway had in 1899 seems to have been eliminated by Simpson. See N. Y. CRM.
PROc. LAW, Articles 690 & 700 (McKinney 1971).
N See text accompanying notes 81-95 supra.
' See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [1968] U. S. CODz
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153-63; note 92 supra.
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electronic visual surveillance, the guidance of a statute, which requires
specific findings and codifies warrant issuance procedures offers the most
pragmatic way to protect privacy without crippling law enforcement."8
Title HI requires the issuing judge to make numerous findings before he
can issue an eavesdropping warrant." The highly intrusive reality of elec-
tronic visual surveillance, particularly videotape surveillance, mandates a
thorough investigation of the application for a warrant by the issuing
judge.' A specific electronic visual surveillance statute will provide best
that the proper investigation is made.
Because New York had no electronic visual surveillance statute,
Teicher objected to the warrant as failing to comply with the New York
electronic eavesdropping law.10 1 His objections highlight the difficulty of
issuing an electronic visual surveillance warrant in accordance with fourth
amendment protection. First, Teicher maintained that there was an insuf-
ficient finding of probable cause for an electronic visual surveillance war-
rant to issue."' Probable cause for a search exists where the applicant for
a warrant has knowledge, through reasonably trustworthy information, of
facts and circumstances warranting a man of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed.10 3 The applicants in
IS Cf. United States v. Brown, 351 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D.N.C. 1972) ("Wiretapping, of
dubious constitutionality at best, should be sanctioned if at all only under the strictest view
of the strict procedures laid down by a careful Congress."); Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337
A.2d 415,425 (1975) (electronic surveillance may be conducted only when done in accord with
rigid constraints imposed by a statutory scheme such as Title I); S. RP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [19681 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153 (legisla-
tion would clarify the confusion swirling around electronic eavesdropping) & 2163 (as of 1968,
all living attorneys general [except Ramsey Clark] advocated legislation to authorize law
enforcement use of electronic eavesdropping).
" See 18 U.S.C. §2518 (1976).
11 In People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 97 n.2, 233 N.E.2d 818, 824 n.2, 286 N.Y.S.2d 801,
809 n.2 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Kaiser v. New York, 394 U.S. 280 (1969), the New York Court
of Appeals stated that "[i]t is precisely because eavesdropping poses such a threat to the
right of privacy that it should be undertaken under strict judicial supervision and subject to
the severest constitutional restraints." In People v. Brenes, .53 App.Div.2d 78, 385 N.Y.S.2d
530, 531 (1976), the court stated that the most exacting and meticulous standards should be
required to authorize electronic eavesdropping before an intrusion into the right of individual
privacy is permitted.
, See note 74 supra.
'"395 N.Y.S.2d at 590, 593-94.
'" Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). In an early Supreme Court decision, Chief
Justice Marshall defined probable cause as evidence which would merely warrant suspicion
and not condemnation. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 560, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813). In
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878), the Court stated that if "facts and circumstances before
the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense
has been committed, it is sufficient" and probable cause exists. Id. at 645; see Steele v. United
States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
A finding of probable cause may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a
criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), so hearsay may be the basis
for issuance of a warrant as long as there is a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960); accord Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114
(1964). Thus, the presence of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonable man
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Teicher relied primarily on hearsay information supplied by the three
named women complaining of indecent liberties taken by Dr. Teicher with-
out their consent.' Reliance upon hearsay information to establish proba-
ble cause is permissible only if the issuing magistrate is informed of the
underlying circumstances relied on by the hearsay informant in reaching
his conclusion of criminal activity, as well as the circumstances from which
the applicant concluded that the informant was credible or that his infor-
mation was reliable.15 If the applicant's affidavit fails to meet either of
these criteria, probable cause may still be established if the affidavit also
recites corroborative evidence which buttresses either the informant's reli-
ability or the reliability of his information."' Implicit in the determination
of probable cause is the view that affidavits should be read in a common
sense rather than a hypertechnical manner."7 In establishing probable
cause, the Teicher court relied on the similarity of the women's stories as
providing corroboration for the various accounts,"' the greater credence
given to named citizen informants,"' and independent police corroboration
of the women's stories."' Thus, the court in Teicher reasonably found
probable cause sufficient to believe a crime had been committed.,
Second, Teicher contended that the electronic visual surveillance war-
rant did not state with sufficient particularity the place where the video-
tape camera was to be installed, the conduct to be observed, and the
duration of the observation."' Because visual images are intangible and
because predicting the precise conduct expected to take place is impossi-
ble, specifying conduct to be observed and "seized" can be accomplished
only through the use of a general description of that conduct."3 The order'"'
to suspect a crime has been committed or is contemplated has sufficed in finding probable
cause.
" 395 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94; see text accompanying note 66 supra.
' Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
' Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-18 (1969).
to? United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965).
' 395 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
' Id. at 594 & n.5.
"' Id. at 594. In Teicher, the defendant had admitted administering drugs to the first
patient/complainant. In addition, he was tape-recorded saying he had kissed the second
patient and enjoyed it, later met the second patient at a bar and made more statements about
how she had kissed him then but not for the first time, and was recorded calling the third
patient on the phone for a date and expressing his desire to come to her apartment and bring
his "bag of goodies." These additional facts corroborated the women's accounts. Id.
"I Several courts have credited the information given by victims of crime without exam-
ining the reliability of the hearsay and its source as required by the Supreme Court. See
United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 380 (2d cir. 1975); United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231,
1238-39 (5th Cir. 1972); text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
"' 395 N.Y.S.2d at 594; see N. Y. CRns. PRoc. LAw §700.30 (McKinney. 1971).
" Hodges, supra note 2, at 283; cf. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir.
1976) (orders authorizing electronic interception of conversations must be sufficiently broad
to allow the interception of any incriminating statements); United States v. Tortorello, 480
F.2d 764, 780 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (order must be broad enough to allow
interception of any statements concerning a specific crime pattern); People v. Grossman, 45
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authorizing visual surveillance in Teicher stated with particularity the
place to be searched"' and described the conduct sought to be seized with
specific reference to past acts cited by the complainants.' A warrant
description is sufficiently particular if the officer executing the search
warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place to be
searched and the things to be seized."7 The officer need not rely on his
discretion to ascertain the scope of the search, and the specter of a general
warrant and search is thereby avoided."' Thus, the order is issued to cir-
cumscribe the search. Failure to particularly state in the order what area
is to be searched and what thing is to be intercepted is a flaw the Supreme
Court has found fatal."' The court in Teicher, however, correctly found the
warrant described the place to be searched and the conduct to be seized
with adequate particularity."2
Teicher's further objection that the order lacked particularity as to the
duration of the visual surveillance was essentially an argument that the
Misc.2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (advance specificity of description of
verbal statements to be seized is impossible although some limiting required).
HI The supporting affidavits were affixed to the order in Teicher. Thus, many of the
particular directives for the executing officers were found in the affidavits and not in the order
itself. Phone conversation with Linda Fairstein, Assistant District Attorney in charge of the
prosecution of Teicher, April 13, 1978. N. Y. Cram. PRoc. LAw §700.30(4) (McKinney 1971)
requires an eavesdropping warrant to contain a particular description of the communications
to be intercepted and the conduct to which the communications relate. Whether or not this
information was contained in the order itself or in the attached affidavits is an important
consideration. The officers executing the warrant should be able to read the order and carry
it out without having to page through affidavits for particular guidance. In United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 778-81 (2d Cir. 1973), the court stated that while attaching affidavits
to the order is not prejudicial error, the better procedure is for the judge to state precisely in
the order what those authorized to execute the warrant are entitled to search for and seize.
In electronic visual surveillance cases, the order should contain all of the court's findings and
instructions so nothing will be left to the discretion of the officers executing the warrant. See
text accompanying notes 115-20 infra.
"1 395 N.Y.S.2d at 595. The affidavits attached to the order clearly required the camera
to be installed on the first floor of the building where defendant had his offices and where
his patients received treatment. Id. The affidavits specified that the camera would be placed
in the first examining room on the left, but instead it was placed in the second room. Id. The
court found no error. Id.; see United States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985, 987-88 (5th Cir.
1975) (search warrant listing incorrect address of place to be searched does not invalidate the
search); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 321 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (apartment listed
in warrant as being on the second floor rather than third floor of building does not invalidate
the search); People v. Brooks, 54 App.Div.2d 333, 335, 388 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (1976) (warrant
listing erroneous name and apartment number, but the correct building does not invalidate
the subsequent search). But see Hodges, supra note 2, at 283 (precise room within premises
where electronic visual surveillance to be undertaken must be specified).
" 395 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
, See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Steele v. United States No. 1,
267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations,
38 TENN. L. Rav. 496, 505-07, 512-16 (1971).
11' See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 196 (1927); People v. Neives, 36 N.Y.2d 396, 369 N.E.2d 26, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50, 57 (1975).
I" See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-56, 58-59 (1967).
' 395 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95.
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order did not provide for minimization of the intrusive observation.' 2' The
New York electronic eavesdropping statute requires the inclusion of a pro-
vision in the surveillance order that the eavesdropping will be conducted
in such a manner as to minimize the interception of unrelated communica-
tions.tn The New York statute additionally requires electronic eavesdrop-
ping to cease when the objective of the surveillance is achieved.12 The
Teicher order provided that the videotape camera was to be activated only
when females cooperating with the police were in the dental chair.lu In
addition, the order was neither to automatically terminate upon the video
recordation of the described conduct nor to continue in excess of thirty
days.12s While the order provided for adequate minimization by only film-
ing Teicher with cooperating females,1 2 the order was too broad in author-
izing observation after incriminating evidence had been obtained. The
court excused this irregularity because the district attorney originally in-
tended to film more than one incident to establish that the dentist's con-
duct was a repeated, ongoing crime.'17 Where no further information was
'=2 Id. at 595-96.
"2 N. Y. Cans. PRoc. LAw §700.30(7) (McKinney 1971) states:
An eavesdropping warrant must contain: ...
7. A provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as
practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to eavesdropping under this article, and
must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in
thirty days.
See 18 U.S.C. §2518(5) (1976).
In N. Y. CRin. PRoc. LAW §700.10(2) (McKinney 1971); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
at 59-60; 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(d), (4)(e), (5) (1976); note 122 supra.
" 395 N.Y.S.2d at 596. Under United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Teicher
arguably had no expectation of privacy because his actions were undertaken in the presence
of another who had consented to the video intrusion. See text accompanying notes 40-45
supra; note 6 supra. There is a difference, however, between reporting actions previously
observed and surreptitiously recording those actions on film. While a conversation may later
be reported to police verbatim by an informant, physical actions can only be described
generally. Moreover, in White the visual surveillance was undertaken in the apartment of the
party consenting to the search while in Teicher the videotape surveillance occurred in
Teicher's office. Thus, while one has no right to consider his actions as private when under-
taken in the presence of another, neither do the police have the right to videotape those
actions because the other party could have reported them. Therefore, the White rationale is
too simplistic and should not be dispositive in this context.
'2 395 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
In Id.
127 Id. The Teicher court cited People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 286 N.E.2d 706, 335
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972), cert. denied sub nom. Zorn v. New York, 410 U.S. 943 (1973), for the
contention that once incriminating evidence has been obtained, prolonged electronic eaves-
dropping is valid because of a continuous, repeated crime. Gnozzo can be distinguished from
Teicher on the basis of the nature of the crime involved. In Gnozzo, the law enforcement
agents were trying to uncover the participants in a gambling conspiracy by monitoring calls
to and from known gamblers. 335 N.Y.S.2d at 259-62. Evidence was not merely being sought
against the parties named in the eavesdropping warrants, but the effort was directed at
obtaining evidence against numerous unknown individuals. Continued monitoring under
these circumstances after one unknown person is inculpated is reasonable and does not
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to be gained by viewing Teicher's additional acts except cumulative evi-
dence of the same offense, continuing observation would have been an
abuse of the police power and clearly not a minimization of intrusive
observation. After the initial illegal act was viewed, no further surveillance
was necessary because Teicher was immediately arrested.2 Nevertheless,
the order, authorizing surveillance beyond that statutorily permitted,
could have tainted the evidence gathered by the electronic visual surveil-
lance had the surveillance continued.12'
Finally, Teicher argued that visual surveillance was unnecessary be-
cause other less intrusive techniques were available to the police.'" Due to
the unique circumstances of the case, however, no other investigative tech-
nique previously employed by the police or available to them was feasi-
ble. 31 Thus, the necessity of electronic visual surveillance in the case was
clearly established if the women's complaints were to be validated or dis-
proved. The New York electronic eavesdropping statute requires the issu-
ing judge to find that normal investigative techniques have failed or are
too dangerous before an eavesdropping warrant can issue.3 2 The Teicher
court found that this condition was met.'1
The Teicher court's reliance on the New York eavesdropping statute to
test the validity of an electronic visual surveillance order is unsound, how-
ever, because the eavesdropping statute does not incorporate visual as well
as aural surveillance within its scope.' While eavesdropping statutes pro-
vide some structure and certainty in the difficult area of electronic visual
surveillance, they do not provide sufficient safeguards to adequately pro-
tect the individual's right of privacy against the pervasive invasion of
videotape surveillance. Authorization to videotape or conduct other elec-
tronic visual surveillance should not be found in a patchwork formed from
statutes or the common law which neither concern nor comprehend such
surveillance. Rather, electronic visual surveillance should be specifically
treated in a statute structured along the lines of Title M.' The New York
trial court's opinion in Teicher establishes that electronic visual surveil-
lance may be necessary and reasonable under certain circumstances. Nev-
ertheless, the court did not recognize that under the current New York
statutory scheme, electronic visual surveillance cannot be utilized because
evidence a lack of minimization of the intrusive surveillance. This rationale is not pertinent
to or persuasive in Teicher.
'21 395 N.Y.S.2d at 596 n.7.
'21 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965); N. Y. Cans. PROC. LAw §710.20
(McKinney Supp. 1977) (suppression statute).
'3 395 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
'3' Id. In Teicher, aural seizures outside Teicher's office had proved unavailing; use of
an undercover agent would have been fruitless because she would have been drugged; elec-
tronic eavesdropping of the "examination" would not have provided evidence of defendant's
acts of sexual abuse. Id.
11 N.Y. CaiM. PRoc. LAw §700.15(4) (McKinney 1971); see 18 U.S.C. §2518(3)(c) (1976).
I= 395 N.Y.S.2d at 596; see text accompanying note 131 supra.
0I See text acompanying note 32 supra.
'3 See VIDEOTAPE STUDY CosmmrrrE, supra note 46, at 71.
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courts are powerless to issue valid warrants.
To adequately protect the individual's right of privacy when electronic
visual surveillance is considered, courts should undertake fourth amend-
ment analysis in such a way that the amendment's protection of privacy
against governmental intrusion is a central element in determining the
reasonableness of a particular intrusion. 1' Additionally, courts should give
effect to the fourth amendment so that increasing degrees of intrusiveness
require higher standards of justification and more stringent procedures for
establishing that justification.3 ' Law enforcement agents should be re-
quired to show the necessity of electronic visual surveillance. Therefore,
such surveillance should be justified in terms of the need for the best
practicable investigatory techniques to combat specified criminal activity.
Nevertheless, to control officer discretion, all applications for electronic
visual surveillance should be scrutinized through police rule-making sub-
ject to judicial review for reasonableness and should be limited by defini-
tive legislation.'
The legislation patterned after Title DI authorizing electronic visual
surveillance should give effect to additional safeguards. The authorization
for electronic visual surveillance should be withheld absent a showing that
all other feasible and less intrusive investigatory techniques have been
tried and have failed, unless they are simply too dangerous.'39 Although a
prior description particularly specifying the precise conduct to be seized
by the camera is impossible, an order authorizing electronic visual surveil-
lance should set forth to the greatest degree possible the exact conduct
sought to be filmed. In this way, the surveillance can be controlled and
does not become a general search.' The current Supreme Court standard
for determining probable cause"' of a "reasonably cautious man's" belief
that an offense has been committed should be given a narrow construction
when considered under the electronic visual surveillance statute. Finally,
the time authorized for the operation of an electronic surveillance warrant
should be as short as is practicable and the camera should be stopped the
moment the narrowly described conduct sought to be seized is recorded.
Moreover, minimization of the interception of unrelated conduct should be
strictly observed through the liberal administration of the exclusionary
rule.'
'1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.15 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967).
'= See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 390.
13 See United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-57 (D. Hawaii 1976); Amsterdam,
supra note 1, at 409-28.
13' Cf. 18 U.S.C. §2518(3)(c) (1976) (normal investigative procedures have been at-
tempted and have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried). To conform to
the fourth amendment, police investigations should be required to intrude as little as possible
on individual privacy.
i See note 7 supra.
1 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
" See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 409-10, 428-38; Spritzer, supra note 7, at 201 n.154.
But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
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Under such comprehensive rules and regulations providing a thorough
examination of the necessity, scope, objective, and execution of electronic
surveillance, such surveillance, if statutorily mandated, should be utilized
and would not violate the fourth amendment. 1 3 However, such surveil-
lance is a dangerous police weapon that requires confining and defining
statutory directives to ensure that today's technology for combating crime
is not tomorrow's tyranny over personal liberty and the individual's right
of privacy."'
S. RICHARD ARNOLD
dissenting) (replace exclusionary rule in favor of administrative or quasi-judicial remedy
against the government to afford compensation and restitution for fourth amendment viola-
tions).
I" The argument that videotape surveillance should be utilized simply because it pro-
vides a complete picture of an individual's actions without reliance on witness testimony is
specious. The privacy of people is protected by the fourth amendment and videotape surveil-
lance should not be utilized if its use would unreasonabley intrude on the individual's privacy.
Easy justifications for electronic visual surveillance are inviting, but ill-considered and in-
complete.
I" See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 416-17.
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